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Primitive people, Claude Lévi-Strauss tells us, have a passion 
for naming, classifying and establishing relations between things, without 
much regard to the accuracy of the classifications or the objective validity 
of the relations. In this they resemble the French. It is no accident that Paris 
should be the world capital of fashion, one of the most complex and most 
arbitrary significative systems ever devised by man (and it is no surprise 
that the structuralist Roland Barthes should have devoted his latest book, 
Système de la mode, to a solemn analysis of this system). Nowhere is the 
preoccupation with system — or for that matter with fashion — more 
evident than in French intellectual life. Since World War II there have been 
two major fashions in French thought: the first was existentialism, which 
lasted until the early fifties, and the second, which took hold in the late 
fifties and early sixties and is now at its peak — or perhaps somewhat past 
it — is structuralism. 
Neither existentialism nor structuralism has had the character of a 
movement in the strict sense of the term, in contrast to such prewar fashions 
as surrealism and Marxism. Marxism was naturally allied with the Party; 
surrealism was identified with André Breton and his followers. In both 
cases, of course, there extended from the center an intellectual region within 
which people wished to claim the title “surrealist” or “Marxist,” although 
they might be disowned by the hard-core disciples. The center, for 
existentialism, was much less well defined; unlike Breton, Sartre never 
assumed the role of pope. In the case of structuralism there is not really a 
center at all. The founding father is generally agreed to be Lévi-Strauss, but 
there are at least four other people who occupy essentially independent 
leading positions, namely Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, Barthes and 
Michel Foucault. To make matters worse, structuralist habits and beliefs are 
quite consistent with those of many other intellectual movements. 
Movements succeed but do not replace one another; surrealism and 
Marxism are still very much alive, and Althusser is a prominent Marxist. 
Lacan, for his part, is a dedicated and fundamentalist Freudian who was 
strongly influenced by surrealism. The others have less striking doctrinal 
commitments, but they come from diverse professional fields — Lévi-
Strauss from anthropology, Barthes from belles lettres and literary criticism, 
Foucault from philosophy. Little wonder that the standards of clarity and 
distinctness learned from Descartes by every student in the lycées have, 
confronted by the structuralist phenomenon, broken down completely. A 
kind of despair can now be detected on the part of French commentators on 
the intellectual scene; a recent article in the Quinzaine Littéraire entitled 
“Où en est le structuralisme?” begins as follows: 
“... In the momentary world of commercialized concepts, eclecti-
cism is the rule.” This statement of Alain Badiou characterizes 
precisely the intellectual debauch to which the pseudo-school which 
has been named structuralism has given rise. 
The article makes the point that while there is a more or less identifiable set 
of contemporary activities properly called structuralist, the indiscriminate 
use of the term has made it almost useless. 
A careful examination of what lies behind the fashion, however, 
reveals a quite definite, and I think very important, common element in 
structuralist thought which fully warrants the view that men as different as 
those named above form a single school, not at all deserving of the 
Quinzaine’s epithet “pseudo-”; the only trouble is that to call this school 
“structuralism,” while not actually misleading, fails to indicate what is most 
significant about it and what binds its members together. The name says 
something interesting about the origins of the movement in structural 
anthropology and structural linguistics, but the line of thought that has 
emerged from the confrontation of those disciplines has more to do with 
linguistic and cultural products (myths, works of literature) and their 
relation to the problem of human subjectivity than with any concept of 
structure in the more obvious sense. Obviously there are structures in 
language and in culture, such as Navajo grammar or Tibetan marriage 
customs, and one might, to consider the anthropological case only, have 
expected that “structuralism” would have taken as its task the analysis of 
such objects in terms of the interrelation of their elements, by contrast to the 
“functionalism” of Malinowski, for example, which conducted its analyses 
in terms of social and psychological purpose. There is in fact an 
anthropological structuralism of precisely this sort, associated mainly with 
the name of Radcliffe-Brown. But the obvious structures, while not 
unimportant, are not what Lévi-Strauss is chiefly interested in. For him the 
really significant structures are beneath the surface, as it were — although 
all such spatial metaphors are dangerous — and may have a series of quite 
different embodiments at the level of apparent structure. A remark in his 
address to a Conference of Anthropologists and Linguists at Indiana in 1953 
gives one of the clearest early indications of the line structuralist thought 
was to take. After commenting on the similarity of problems encountered in 
the two fields he said: 
... we have not been sufficiently aware of the fact that both language 
and culture are the product of activities which are basically similar. I 
am now referring to this uninvited guest which has been seated during 
this Conference beside us, and which is the human mind. 
The event which has brought structuralism most vividly to the 
attention of the English-speaking world has been the recent publication of 
a translation of Lévi-Strauss’ La Pensée sauvage. It has been pointed out 
by a number of critics that the translation of the title (The Savage Mind) is 
unfortunate, and in fact it manages, with a single literalism, to throw the 
emphasis off to a quite extraordinary degree. The book is about systems of 
thought in so-called primitive societies, and the “savage” mind suggests a 
contrast with the “civilized” mind to be found in more “advanced” 
societies. All the terms in quotes, at least to the extent that they suggest a 
hierarchy of value (as they inevitably do) would be rejected by Levi-
Strauss. The trouble with “savage” in English is that it now has only one 
level of meaning; while it was once possible to use the term in a more or 
less descriptive way (“the friendly savages”) it has come to mean 
hopelessly uncivilized or downright ferocious. “Sauvage,” on the other 
hand, has the connotations of “wild” in English as it applies to plants and 
animals which are not at all ferocious but on the contrary represent a 
special kind of natural value (un canard sauvage is a wild duck, not a 
savage duck). ‘'La pensée sauvage” is therefore, as Lévi- Strauss himself 
remarks, “mind in its untamed state,” and it represents not just the mind of 
savages but the human mind, and therefore our mind. It is this relevance of 
his work to contemporary man’s understanding of himself that has placed 
Lévi-Strauss at the center of the current intellectual scene. 
It is worth noting that the universality which Lévi-Strauss attributes to 
mind does not involve him in the absurdity, as some have suggested, of 
maintaining that there is no essential difference between primitive societies 
and modem ones. The difference, however, he sees as one of social 
organization and not as involving essentially a disparity of mental powers 
or even of patterns of thought. In an interview (one in a series with Georges 
Charbonnier, published as an issue of Les Lettres nouvelles in 1961) he 
compares the two types of society to two types of machine, clocks and steam 
engines: primitive societies, like clocks, use a constant input of energy and 
“have a tendency to maintain themselves indefinitely in their initial state, 
which explains why they appear to us as societies without history and 
without progress”; modem societies, on the other hand, like thermodynamic 
rather than mechanical machines, “operate in virtue of a difference of 
temperature between their parts . . . (which is realized by different forms of 
social hierarchy, whether slavery, serfdom, or class distinctions); they 
produce much more work than the others, but consume and progressively 
destroy their sources of energy.” This is not doctrinaire Marxism of the kind 
that is to be found in Althusser, for example, but it does represent a 
willingness, common to all the structuralists, to take Marx seriously and to 
admit the validity of many of his criticisms of Western civilization, an 
attitude which is in refreshing contrast to the polarity of disapproval and 
defiance which still clings, now somewhat vestigially, to discussions of such 
questions in the United States. In fact I think it is possible to account for the 
difference in other than social terms without abandoning the structuralist 
approach (and without, of course, mitigating the social consequences), but 
that is getting ahead of the exposition. 
It has by now become a commonplace of linguistics that the oldest 
languages are not necessarily the simplest, from the point of view either of 
grammar or of vocabulary. The complexity of ancient (and of primitive) 
grammar has always been a puzzle, although in the structuralist context it is 
easy enough to see it as a manifestation of a constant mental complexity; 
the standard account of the complex vocabulary, however, has been that it 
answered to certain strictly practical needs of the users of the language — 
as reflected in the fact, for example, that there are seven Eskimo words for 
“snow.” But Lévi- Strauss amasses a great quantity of evidence to show that 
the naming of details of variation in the natural environment, among 
primitive people, goes far beyond any possible considerations of utility and 
amounts to what he calls a “science of the concrete” — not always accurate 
by the standards of modern classification (although far more so than early 
ethnologists were prepared to believe), but having in the primitive 
intellectual world just the function that science, in its nonutilitarian aspect, 
has in ours, namely that of organizing the totality of experience into a 
coherent whole. Using the resources of this rich descriptive language the 
primitive mind shows a tendency to build intelligible structures on more 
abstract levels: magic, which corresponds to science in its practical aspect 
(and which sometimes works, although that is not of the first importance); 
myth, which corresponds to literature; totemism, which corresponds to 
morality in providing rules of conduct of a satisfyingly rigorous nature, 
offenses against which are suitably dangerous. Modem man thinks of these 
things as childish curiosities which he has long since outgrown, failing to 
see that science is his magic, literature and other forms of entertainment his 
myths, morality his totemism. 
Part of what conceals from us our interior link with the primitive is a 
habit, inculcated by the development of modern science, of looking for the 
proper way of building these various structures, on the assumption that the 
main function of language is to communicate truth and that consistency is a 
greater virtue than creativity (except, of course, within the carefully marked-
off region known as “art”). We have all become engineers with concepts, 
working from plans and anxious to get the structure right. The primitive 
however is not an ingénieur but a bricoleur (a word for which there is no 
really satisfactory English equivalent). He puts together his structures from 
whatever comes in handy, without special concern for the congruity of their 
elements. Bricolage is the kind of thing that is made out of tar paper and 
baling wire; the bricoleur is the handyman, the tinkerer, who gets 
surprisingly practical (and often aesthetic) results from the most unlikely 
material. One of the fundamental theses of La Pensée sauvage is that the 
structure is all-important, the material largely irrelevant; it is as though the 
mind had to busy itself about something of sufficient complexity, but cared 
very little about the nature (or the logical level) of its components. Lévi-
Strauss gives many examples of homologous mythical structures in which 
elements and relations change places from one tribe to another, sometimes 
arriving at what in Western eyes would be a complete contradiction; the 
native informer, however, recognizes the same structure beneath the 
contradiction and cannot understand why an apparent inconsistency matters. 
Although the “same” structure can sustain different embodiments, that 
does not mean that the primitive mind apprehends it as disembodied. This 
is one of the most elusive but most important points in structuralist theory. 
As Jean Pouillon puts it in his “Essai de définition,” at the beginning of a 
recent issue of Les Temps modernes devoted to structuralism: 
Structuralism is not formalism. On the contrary, it challenges the 
distinction between form and matter, and no matter is a priori in-
accessible to it. As Lévi-Strauss writes, “form defines itself by op-
position to a content which is exterior to it; but structure has no content: 
it is itself the content, apprehended in a logical organization conceived 
as a property of the real.” 
The world becomes intelligible as it becomes structured, primarily through 
the agency of language, secondarily through the agency of magic, totem and 
myth. There are many languages and many myths; structuralism finds that 
they are homologous, and capable of being generated out of one another by 
means of suitable transformations. Language, myth, and so on represent the 
way in which man has been able to grasp the real, and for him they constitute 
the real; they are not structures of some ineffable reality which lies behind 
them and from which they are separable. To say that the world is intelligible 
means that it presents itself to the mind of the primitive as a message, to 
which his language and behavior are an appropriate response — but not as 
a message from elsewhere, simply as a message, as it were, in its own right. 
I am aware that this way of talking seems obscure, and uncomfortably 
reminiscent of McLuhan, but it is the way Lévi-Strauss has chosen to 
express the natural assumption of intelligibility with which mind confronts 
the world. The message, furthermore, is unitary, a fact which modem man 
easily forgets: 
... we prefer to operate with detached pieces, if not indeed with “small 
change,” while the native is a logical hoarder: he is forever tying the 
threads, unceasingly turning over all the aspects of reality, whether 
physical, social or mental. We traffic in our ideas; he hoards them up. 
And in this way he avoids the fragmentation we frequently lament in our 
own lives. But it would be a mistake to suppose that he has access to a kind 
of conceptual stability denied to us, by virtue of some now lost insight into 
things as they are. He looks for no such insight and therefore does not miss 
it; it is enough to be engaged in the structuring activity, whatever form it 
may take, to be relieved of any uneasiness about lack of foundations or of 
meaning or of the other things for which modem man, anguished and 
alienated as he is, often yearns so eloquently. 
If mind in its natural state finds this psychic equilibrium so easily, how 
does it come about that modern man has such difficulty in adjusting himself 
to the conditions of his existence? We may have moments of equilibrium, 
significantly enough when we are wholly engaged in some activity (as might 
by now be expected, it doesn’t matter much what activity, whether athletic, 
intellectual or artistic), but left to our own reflective devices we tend to be 
a bewildered and discontented lot. This bewilderment and discontent 
manifest themselves in all sorts of projects for self-improvement, self-
realization, even self-discovery, all of which the primitive would find 
completely mystifying. He is in the fortunate condition of not knowing that 
he has a self, and therefore of not being worried about it. And the 
structuralists have come to the conclusion that he is nearer the truth than we 
are, and that a good deal of our trouble arises out of the invention of the self 
as an object of study, from the belief that man has a special kind of being, 
in short from the emergence of humanism. Structuralism is not a humanism, 
because it refuses to grant man any special status in the world. Obviously it 
cannot deny that there are individual men who observe, think, write and so 
on (although it does not encourage them in the narcissistic effort of “finding 
themselves,” to use the popular jargon). Nor does it deny that there are more 
or less cohesive social groups with their own histories and cultures. Nothing 
concrete recognized or valued by the humanist is excluded, only the 
theoretical basis of humanism. In order to clarify this point it is necessary 
to consider the central question of structuralism, which comes to dominate 
all discussions of it (as for example it did most strikingly a year ago at the 
Johns Hopkins conference), namely the status of the subject. 
The subject, first of all, is a linguistic category, the “vantage” (to use 
an expression due to Benveniste) of verbs in the first person. As such it is 
important only for purposes of clarity in reference: it avoids confusion 
between persons. (Strictly speaking the first person refers to the subject “I”; 
the other “personal” subject you and the “nonpersonal” subject he, however, 
do not lend themselves as readily to overinterpretation.) The subject is a 
vantage-point in nonlinguistic senses too: I look at the world from a 
particular point of view, I act upon it from a particular strategic location. So 
far there is no difficulty about the matter. But — whether under the 
influence of Greek philosophy, or Christianity, or Renaissance humanism 
— Western man began to look for a more substantial embodiment of the 
subject than that provided by his own contingent and transient body as 
percipient and agent, or by his linguistic habits as a mere point of reference. 
Just as the assertion that the world is a message now elicits the immediate 
response “from whom?” so the intelligibility of the world seems to be 
addressed to something more basic and more permanent that the momentary 
and evanescent subject of particular utterances or particular actions. If God 
had to be invented to originate and sustain the world, man had to be invented 
to perceive and understand it. Men therefore began to ask “What am I?” in 
a nonlinguistic sense, much as they also asked “What is matter?” or “What 
is gravity?” They began, in other words, the long and frustrating attempt to 
get the subject out into the world so that it could be examined objectively. 
But this involves a logical mistake and can easily lead to a psychoanalytic 
disaster. 
The psychoanalyst among the structuralists is of course Lacan, and he 
has devoted a large part of his work to the problem of subjectivity. Lacan’s 
career began at least as early as Lévi-Strauss’, and it is evident from his 
collected writings (Ecrits, 1966) that he represents a genuinely independent 
source for structuralism. His reputation in France rests mainly on his 
Seminar at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, whose members hold him 
in a regard reminiscent of that in which Wittgenstein was reputedly held by 
his students at Cambridge. Lacan has been in no special hurry to get his 
ideas into general circulation, and there is no systematic development to be 
traced. Starting always from Freud, he wanders by circuitous paths, and in 
a highly personal, extremely difficult and often irritating style, compounded 
with verbal preciosity, hermetic allusions and a kind of half-concealed 
amusement at the whole enterprise, into various problematic comers of 
contemporary thought. The impressive thing is that (once the barrier of style 
has been surmounted) he consistently throws light on them from a 
completely original angle. 
What makes Lacan a structuralist is his insistence on the central place 
of language. “Whether it wishes to regard itself as an agent of cure, of 
development, or of inquiry,” he writes, 
psychoanalysis has but one medium: the word of the patient. . . . We 
shall show that there is no word without response, even if it is greeted 
only with silence, as long as there is a hearer, and that that fact is the 
clue to its function in analysis. . . . 
This shows at once the parallel with Lévi-Strauss, although with a difference 
of scale: the message is particular rather than universal. The structure of 
language is, as before, the key to the structure of mind. On the opening page 
of Ecrits, in a short introduction to the collection as a whole, Lacan provides 
a characteristic example of his own style and a characteristically involuted 
formulation of a problem: 
“Style is the man himself,” we repeat, without seeing in it any malice, 
nor being troubled by the fact that man is an uncertain reference. . . . 
Style is the man, let us adopt the formula, only to extend it: the man to 
whom one addresses oneself? 
This would simply be to satisfy the principle we have put forward: that 
in language our message comes to us from the Other, and to enunciate 
it to the limit: in an inverted form. (And let us remember that this 
principle is applied to its own enunciation. . . .) 
But if man were reduced to being nothing but the point of return of our 
discourse, would not the question come back to us what is the point of 
addressing it to him? 
Once the urge to dismiss this as pretentious rubbish has been overcome it 
begins to reveal a preoccupation which, as much as anything else, is the 
hallmark of structuralist activity. The reference to self-reference, the idea of 
language doubling back on itself, are examples of that dédoublement of 
which recent French writers have become so fond. 
(It would not be improper, according to Levi-Strauss, to think of his own 
work as “the myth of mythology.”) They are important because the subject, 
for Lacan, turns out to be a kind of dédoublement, a matching of 
consciousness with the world, of speaker with hearer, of the signifier with 
the signified. The latter terms are from the linguistics of Saussure, and are 
of crucial significance to the structuralists. Whereas the civilized mind 
thinks itself capable of taking an objective stance and judging the adequacy 
of language or symbol (the signifier) to their meanings (the signified), the 
view of mind which emerges from ethnology and psychoanalysis suggests 
that the two realms are autonomous and that mind is precisely this adequacy, 
so that such objectivity is impossible. 
This point is made again and again, in different forms and different 
occasions, in the writings of Lacan. The subject is an activity, not a thing; 
the Cartesian cogito comes closer to representing it correctly than any view 
of the self as substance, but even the cogito gives too strong a sense of 
continuity and permanence, so that it would perhaps be better to say “cogito 
ergo sum” ubi cogito, ibi sum. The subject produces itself by reflecting on 
itself, but when it is engaged on some other object it has no being apart from 
the activity of being so engaged. The idea that it had objective being and 
could be studied scientifically, according to Lacan, was a direct 
consequence of the success of science in throwing light on the rest of the 
world. The troubled Viennese came to Freud because he was a scientist and 
had the prestige that went with that identification; but when Freud looked 
for the subject in the light of science he found instead the unconscious, the 
Other, as Lacan puts it. Freud’s own subjectivity, of course, was engaged 
on this quest, and its discovery by itself would have been, again, a case of 
impossible self-division. Although Lacan never quite puts it this way one 
could sum up the conclusion of his argument against the possibility of a 
science of the subject by saying: the subject cannot be the object of science 
because it is its subject. When the analyst tries to get at “the subject which 
he calls, significantly, the patient,” what he finds is not the true subject at 
all, but only something called into being by his questioning: “that is to say, 
the fish is drowned by the operation of fishing. . . .” The final image of the 
subject, in the most recent writings, is the Moebius strip, or as Lacan calls 
it “the interior eight,” which from two surfaces produces one, or from one 
two, depending on the starting-point. What Lacan seems to be saying is that 
the subject cannot give an analytic account of itself, only paradoxes, hints 
and images; and this being the case “there is no science of man.” 
There is no science of man, because the man of science does not exist, 
only its subject. 
It is known that I have always felt a repugnance for the term sciences 
humaines, which seems to me a call to slavery itself. 
One of the most powerful structuralist blows against traditional 
humanism was administered by the publication in 1966 of Michel 
Foucault’s Les Mots et les choses. The starting-point for the reflections 
which resulted in the book, he says in the preface, was a text of Borges, 
which is worth quoting for itself as well as for the light it throws on the 
structuralist enterprise. 
This text cites “a certain Chinese encyclopedia” where it is written that 
“animals are divided into: a) belonging to the Emperor, b) embalmed, 
c) tame, d) suckling pigs, e) mermaids, f) fabulous, g) dogs running 
free, h) included in the present classification, i) which behave like 
madmen, j) innumerable, k) drawn on camel-skin with a very fine 
brush, 1) et cetera, m) which have just broken their leg, n) which from 
a distance look like flies.” 
And Foucault continues: 
In our astonishment at this taxonomy what strikes us with sudden 
force, what, because of its setting, is presented to us as the exotic charm 
of another system of thought, is the limitation of our own: the stark 
impossibility of thinking that. 
Why, Foucault asks, do we find Borges’ imaginary Chinese classification 
so preposterous? Into what intellectual straitjacket has our own history 
forced us? And he concludes that our resistance to this kind of spontaneous 
absurdity, our demand for logical coherence even where it is unnecessary, 
is again a product, of the invention of man as an embodiment of analytic 
reason. Until early modern times individual and collective subjectivity were 
absorbed in Discourse, a human activity (a linguistic one, which in context 
amounts to the same thing) constituting the world as intelligible and 
summing up all that could be said about it. The rise of science led to the 
fragmentation and dissolution of this conceptual and linguistic unity, by 
drawing attention to separable properties of the world — biological, 
economic, philological — and pursuing them independently. But it then 
became apparent that in some sense all these enquiries were about the same 
thing; only instead of recombining into a single activity, they were thought 
of as pointing to a single entity — Man. Man thus appeared to have achieved 
his own objectification. The present perplexity of the so-called “humanities” 
indicates, however, that that conclusion was premature; the picture of man 
which they present to us turns out to bear little resemblance to the real thing. 
Humanism has been a detour from which we may be beginning to return to 
the main track: Foucault concludes with a more or less confident prediction 
that man will disappear “like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.” 
This must not be misunderstood as a prophecy of doom. Men will still 
be here, facing the same problems in the same way, with the exception that 
the particular aberration called man wall have been done away with. All 
attempts to classify and predict individual human behavior quickly 
encounter limits which show them, in all but a few cases (and all these to 
some extent pathological), to be futile. Rational, humanist aesthetics, for 
example, yielded when put into practice a wooden imitation of art; art began 
to revive in this century when the surrealists and others preached liberation 
from orthodox canons and advocated the free play of the unconscious. The 
havoc that the social sciences are capable of wreaking surrounds us on every 
side. There is nothing wrong with the social sciences, of course, if they are 
enquiries into group behavior or even individual behavior carried on by 
somebody for whom that behavior constitutes an object; they become 
dangerous only when ignorant people believe what they are told about 
themselves and become what the social scientist says they are. 
Structuralism, in effect, advocates an engagement with the world, an 
abandonment of too much self-examination in favor of participation in some 
significative activity, which in structuring the world will bring the subject 
into equilibrium with it. What activity is a matter of wide choice. There is 
nothing particularly worthy, as the existentialists thought, in political or 
even in artistic activity; any number of others are capable of embodying the 
structure of mind. 
Art and politics, nevertheless, as two of the most comprehensive 
structures available, have come in for special attention, and above all 
literature, since it employs directly the very archetype of structure, namely 
language itself. But there is more than one kind of structuralist criticism, 
and the overlap with other preoccupations is greater here than anywhere 
else. The great triumph of the structural method, which imitated the sciences 
in producing new knowledge, remains in fact the work of the Marxist critic 
Lucien Goldmann on Pascal and Racine, in the course of which he was able 
to reconstruct some parts of the Jansenist movement which had been 
forgotten, and furthermore to find evidence that they had in fact existed (the 
relevant works are of course Le Dieu caché and Correspondance de Martin 
de Barcos, abbe de Saint-Cyran). I have not included Goldmann in the list 
of structuralists because much of what I have taken to define the movement 
does not apply to him, and his own method, which he calls “genetic 
structuralism,” rests very heavily on the notion of literature as an 
embodiment (often in spite of the intentions of the writer) of some collective 
social attitude appropriate to a class or a period. Structuralist criticism in the 
wider sense does not limit itself to collective or social or historical 
considerations, although it does not ignore them either. The work is a 
structure; the critic uses it as a point of departure. One of the striking things 
about this criticism, in fact, is its habit of getting a great deal more out of a 
work than the author or for that matter his historical period could possibly 
have put into it. Foucault, in Les Mots et les choses, spends the whole first 
chapter on a painting of Velásquez, “The Maids of Honor,” from which he 
extracts by hindsight and free elaboration a whole theory of the “absence of 
the subject” (another pivotal concept of structuralism). And Althusser, who 
has applied structuralist techniques to a “rethinking” of Marx, is said in a 
recent essay in Aletheia to have developed a complete apparatus “for putting 
oneself in condition to read Marx so as to think profitably not only what 
Marx wrote but also what he thought without writing.” 
This last claim, it should be noted, is not made by Althusser himself, 
and was not necessarily meant kindly. The same article calls Althusser’s 
works (Pour Marx; Lire Le Capital) “limiting cases of interpretation,” and 
suggests that what is presented there is not just Marx but something much 
more, which Marx indeed could not have created, since he did not enjoy the 
advantages of the intervening hundred years. And this is quite in keeping 
with the principles of structuralist criticism. The clearest statement of these 
principles is to be found in Barthes’s Critique et verité, a response to 
Picard’s Nouvelle critique ou nouvelle imposture, in turn an attack on 
Barthes’s Sur Racine. Picard, a typical humanist, had become indignant at 
the way in which Barthes had, in his view, tampered with literary and 
historical objectivity, with the “facts” about Racine. (Another common 
element in structuralist thought is its distrust, in the so-called sciences 
humaines, of the flat empiricism, of the natural sciences, principally because 
in the human context a great deal of interpretation goes into deciding what 
the facts are.) Barthes points out that there could be a “science” of literature 
only if we would be content to regard the work simply as a “written object,” 
disregarding its sense in favor of all its possible senses, disregarding its 
author in favor of its more generalized linguistic origins — treating it, in 
fact, as the ethnologist treats a myth. What criticism does, by contrast, is to 
produce one of the possible senses of the work, to construct alongside it, as 
it were, another work (the interpretation) as a hypothesis in the light of 
which the details of the original become intelligible. “The book is a world,” 
says Barthes. “The critic confronted by the book is subject to the same 
conditions of utterance as the writer confronted by the world.” But the critic 
can never replace the reader; the individual also confronts the book at a 
particular time, in a particular context; it becomes part of his experience, 
presents itself to him with a certain intelligibility, as a message (from 
whom?); it engages him in another episode of the structuring activity which 
makes him what he is. An old book is not (unless the reader takes pains to 
make it so) a bit of antiquity, it is a bit of the present; consequently Racine 
can still be read, and new critical views about Racine, possible only in the 
light of contemporary events, can find in him without distortion meanings 
which he and his contemporaries could not even have understood. Similarly 
Althusser is justified in his rethinking of Marx; indeed all works have 
constantly to be rethought if they are to be more than archaeological 
curiosities. 
The consideration of structuralist criticism brings us back to Lévi-
Strauss. The critic never says all there is to be said about a book; his reading 
is always an approximation which we know to be inadequate, even if we do 
not know what would constitute an adequate reading — even if it makes no 
sense to imagine such a reading. Similarly language never formulates the 
world adequately; nor does myth; nor does science, in spite of its (now 
abandoned) aspiration to completability in principle; nor does history. These 
structures change in time (they can, to use structuralist jargon, be considered 
in diachronic as well as in synchronic aspects); also, which is not the same 
thing, they are dynamic, having complex interrelations among themselves. 
The respect in which I think Lévi-Strauss does not exploit the full resources 
of his own method in distinguishing between primitive and modern societies 
has to do with this complexity of interrelation of structures. If mind 
emerged, as it surely did, under evolutionary pressure which required an 
order of complexity in behavior greater than that of any other form of life, 
if when the evolutionary pressure was off it devised language as a means of 
keeping that complexity in dynamic equilibrium with its world, then it 
seems to me the way was opened for a kind of amplification of complexity 
by shifting language from the side of the object to the side of the subject, 
where mind (now ramified with language) became capable of handling an 
even greater objective complexity, and indeed required it in order to 
maintain equilibrium. We are perhaps today in one of the later stages of such 
an exponential development. 
If that should be the case we might well cultivate the totalizing quality 
of the primitive mind, of which Lévi-Strauss speaks at the end of La Pensée 
sauvage. It is there (in the course of a polemic against Sartre) that he refers 
also to “this intransigent refusal on the part of the savage mind to allow 
anything human (or even living) to remain alien to it.” This allusion to one 
of the oldest mottoes of humanism may seem an odd conclusion, to a 
discussion of an anti-humanist point of view; but I think the truth is that here 
again Lévi-Strauss does not go far enough. To restrict the sphere of concern 
to the human, or even to the living, does not do justice to mind as its own 
history has revealed it. The structuring activity which keeps the subject in 
balance with the world is and must be all-encompassing. To quote Pouillon 
once more, “structuralism forbids us to enclose ourselves in any particular 
reality.” The fact that we abandon a restrictive humanism, however, does 
not mean that we cease to be men. If structuralism had a motto it might well 
be: Homo sum, nihil a me alienum puto. 
The danger with attitudes as generous as this is, of course, that they 
may in the end become completely uncritical. A theory that applies to 
everything does not distinguish between different things and might as well 
apply to nothing; if every human activity allows a structuralist 
interpretation, the fact that any particular activity does so ceases to be 
instructive. The structuralist thesis seems to me to bear the stamp of truth, 
but there is a penalty for arriving at the truth, namely that in at least one 
important respect nothing remains to be done. Here again there is an 
illuminating parallel with existentialism, and one that I think throws a good 
deal of light on the difference in habits of thought between French 
intellectuals and Anglo-American ones (especially philosophers). Once one 
sees that the conscious subject is isolated and alone, or that the variety of 
human activity is to be accounted for by an inveterate urge to build intel-
ligible structures, everything appears in a new light, nothing is ever the same 
again — but for the most part the old problems remain problematic, at any 
rate from the analytic point of view. The fact that existentialism and 
structuralism do not lend themselves to theoretical elaboration may account 
for their unpopularity with Anglo-American thinkers whose tastes run to the 
technical and the abstract. 
The French, on the other hand, never seem to tire of elaboration in the 
direction of the discursive and the concrete: literary philosophy permits the 
repetition of the same truth in a variety of ways, philosophical literature and 
belles lettres permit its demonstration in a variety of contexts. The best 
Structuralist writers have developed these forms to a point of great finesse. 
Jacques Derrida, the most recent star of the movement, exemplifies the 
philosophical mode brilliantly in his collection L’écriture et la difference, 
published in Paris last summer; Barthes remains the master of the literary 
mode, and his lecture on “La Mythologie de la Tour Eiffel,” given during 
his stay in the U.S. this winter, was a perfect example of it. In the vein of 
his earlier Mythologies, it showed that while structuralism may leave 
unchanged the structure of the world at large, it structures for us the various 
parts of the world with which we come in contact — a process, in Barthes’ 
own words, of “conquest by the intelligible.” Its great contribution has been 
to provide a strategy for this conquest, to claim once again for intellect a 
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